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1  INTRODUCTION
South Africa faces a number of critical challenges, most notably poverty, un-
employment and income inequality. The concept of the country having two 
economies – the first being ‘an advanced, sophisticated economy, based on 
skilled labour, which is becoming more globally competitive’ and the second 
being ‘a mainly informal, marginalised and unskilled economy, populated by 
the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector’ – nicely cap-
tures the structural consequences of these problems.2 Certainly, this deep divi-
sion is a long way from government’s vision of a ‘prosperous, equitable, stable 
and democratic society [and]…of decent work and living standards for all’.3 
The promotion of the small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) sector 
has long been advocated by government as a way of accelerating job creation 
and poverty alleviation, and thereby assisting in bridging the inequality gap.4 
This has resulted in a number of policies and programmes that have sought 
to remove obstacles to SMME development as well as stimulate their growth. 
Access to finance has been identified as one of the most important factors 
that hamper SMMEs’ potential to succeed.5 
SMMEs, however, have proved to be a difficult target for policy-makers, not 
least because what is good for medium-sized enterprises is not necessarily good 
for micro enterprises. This is evident in the case of access to credit. While ac-
cess to credit is a challenge for SMMEs in general, micro and small enterprises 
 
  1 LLB, LLM (UCT); BSocSci (Hons) (UCT); BA (Hons), MA (UCT), BProc (UNISA). The former two 
authors were postgraduate students at the University of Cape Town and researchers in the Labour 
and Enterprise Policy Research Group’s project on the regulation of microfinance. The latter author 
is a Senior Researcher in the Labour and Enterprise Policy Research Group at the University of Cape 
Town. 
  2 The Presidency Towards a Ten Year Review p 97 as cited in DBSA Overcoming underdevelopment in 
South Africa’s second economy, 2005 Development Report p 35 and ‘Approaches to poverty reduction 
and economic development VII: transform the second economy’ 2004 26(4) ANC Today 1. 
  3 ANC Umrabulo 2 p1
  4 Small, medium and micro enterprises are a diverse group of enterprises. They are defined in the Na-
tional Small Business Act 102 of 1996 according to a number of criteria. There is general consensus 
that the different size categories of SMMEs serve different purposes: while micro and small enter-
prises are generally associated with poverty alleviation, medium enterprises have been identified as 
the major vehicle for employment generation. 
  5 Other factors include access to markets, management and technical skills, technology and finance.
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(MSEs)6 experience this problem more acutely than established medium-sized 
enterprises.7 MSEs can be defined as owner-driven and owner-managed enter-
prises with less than 50 employees,8 usually initiated out of necessity due to a 
lack of better choices for work,9 that exist along a continuum of varying degrees 
of formality.10 Another defining feature of MSEs is that most are ‘unbanked’, 
that is they cannot access credit from the mainstream financial sector: com-
mercial banks, large investment houses and commercial credit providers.11 
MSEs are unbanked for a number of reasons. The main reason is that most 
financial institutions are reluctant to lend to MSEs because of the high cost 
of servicing loans to such firms relative to the size of the loan.12 It is generally 
accepted that the cost of servicing a loan is the same regardless of the amount 
involved.13 The transaction cost per Rand lent is therefore much higher for 
small loans than for larger loans, making smaller loans less profitable.14 Fur-
thermore, interest regulations may limit the loan sizes from which credit pro-
viders can legally recover these costs and make a profit.15 Because smaller 
loans are relatively more costly it appears that banks are not willing to enter 
the SMME market below a threshold of R250 000.16 This has created a gap in 
credit provision for smaller loans.
Risk factors also hinder lending to MSEs. Risk assessment, which is highly 
standardised in formal financial institutions and based on the credit histo-
ries of potential borrowers, rules out many small and micro entrepreneurs 
because they lack documented credit histories.17 In addition, formal financial 
 
  6 Angela Motsa and Associates SMME finance sector background paper: a review of key documents on 
SMME finance 199-200 (2004) Paper commissioned by Finmark Trust p 6. 
  7 Berry A, Von Blottnitz M, Cassim R, Kesper A, Rajaratnam B, Van Seventer D E The Economics of 
SMMEs in South Africa (2002) paper for Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies p 4: Angela Motsa (fn 
6 above)16; Ligthelm A ‘Informal trading through home-based micro-enterprise: the role of spaza 
shops’ 2005 22(2) Development Southern Africa 199 211. 
  8 This is the threshold that defines a small business for all sectors in the National Small Enterprise Act 
102 of 1996.
  9 Angela Motsa (fn 6 above) 6. 
10 Formality relates to the extent to which economic activities of an enterprise comply with legal regula-
tions. An enterprise is ‘informal’ to the extent that its operations do not comply with legal regulations 
– either because they do not apply to the enterprise or due to non-compliance with applicable regula-
tions. It is possible for an enterprise to comply with some legal regulations and not comply with oth-
ers. Thus, ‘formality and informality do not constitute a dichotomy, but a continuum.’: Reinecke, G 
and White, S Policies for small enterprises: Creating the right environment for good jobs (2004) p 52. 
11 Schoombie A ‘South African banks and the unbanked: progress and prospects’, Paper presented at 
the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, Somerset West, 2003 p 5.
12 The costs include those of screening potential borrowers in order to determine risk and default and 
of creating and implementing incentives and enforcement mechanisms to ensure repayment. 
13 Berry et al (fn 7 above) 72. 
14 Schoombie (fn 11) 5.
15 Ibid.
16 There are some indications that R 100 000 is the minimum level at which banks are willing to enter 
the SMME market. However, the few alternative financial institutions that exclusively target un-
banked MSEs indicate that banks largely ignore the market below R250 000. In addition, Khula also 
indicates the need to focus on the market for loans below R250 000. While the R10 000 to R100 000 
range is a critical gap in the provision of credit, R250 000 will be used as a guideline to identify the 
unbanked MSE market. Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation and other developmental credit 
providers at the Public Hearings on the National Credit Bill on 08/08/2005.
17 Jaffer J ‘Microfinance and the mechanics of solidarity lending: Improving access to credit through 
innovations in contract structure’ 1999 9 J. Transnational law and policy 183; Angela Motsa (fn 6 
above) 16-17. 
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institutions determine that most micro and small entrepreneurs do not have 
sufficient experience and lack adequate managerial skills to ensure the viabil-
ity of the enterprise.18 Finally, the majority of micro and small entrepreneurs 
lack the conventional collateral (in the form of immovable property or valu-
able movables) that formal financial institutions require as security in the 
event of default.19 
In South Africa an added twist is that the majority of MSEs are black-
owned. Historically, private sector financial institutions such as banks and 
investment houses have been racially and economically exclusive.20 Until 
recently, very few alternative institutions existed to serve the needs of less af-
fluent, black entrepreneurs. Furthermore, it is arguable that given the legacy 
of apartheid the risk factors relating to credit histories, managerial exper-
tise and collateral affect black entrepreneurs more than their white counter-
parts.21 This is another reason why MSEs have greater difficulty in accessing 
credit from the formal financial sector22 than more established medium-sized 
enterprises, many of which are white-owned.23
Since the late 1960s the regulatory framework for the microfinance sector 
was provided by the Usury Act and two exemptions to the Act introduced in 
1992 and 1999. This framework has proved woefully inadequate to the task 
of regulating the sector, compounding some of the problems outlined above 
and failing to provide a platform for the development of SMMEs. It became 
increasingly evident to policy-makers and stakeholders during the 1990s that 
a new regulatory framework was needed. Such a framework would have mul-
tiple goals given the diversity of the credit industry, but a key aim would have 
to be the radical improvement of access to credit for SMMEs.
Government’s response was the National Credit Act.24 The statute com-
prehensively overhauls the regulatory system for the credit industry and 
promises to have far-reaching consequences for most businesses and many 
individuals. The bulk of its provisions indicate that the Act’s main objectives 
are to regulate the commercial aspects of credit provision and to protect vul-
nerable borrowers, but it does provide some innovations in respect of access 
to credit for SMMEs. The question is whether it has done enough with regard 
to the latter to make a significant impact on SMME development and thereby 
make inroads into the unemployment, poverty and income inequality that 
underpin the deep schism in the South African economy. 
18 Interviews with staff of financial institutions and NGO credit providers.
19 Schoombie (fn 11 above); Schoombie A ‘Getting South African Banks to serve micro-entrepreneurs: 
An analysis of policy options’ Development Southern Africa 17(5) 2000 751 p 762; Angela Motsa (fn 
6 above) 16; Berry et al (fn 7 above) 96.
20 For a more detailed discussion of the history of the financial sector in relation to SMME finance, see 
Meagher P and Wilkinson B ‘Filling the Gap in South Africa’s Small and Micro Credit Market: An 
analysis of major policy, legal and regulatory issues’ (2001) Report submitted to the MFRC p 4 ff and 
Porteous D ‘Is Cinderella finally coming to the ball? SA micro finance in broad perspective’ Undated 
draft at www.finmark.co.za 3. 
21 Berry et al (fn 7 above) 74.
22 Berry et al (fn 7 above) 79; Angela Motsa (fn 6 above) 11, 15-16. 
23 Berry et al (fn 7 above) 74. 
24 34 of 2005. 
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This article provides a critical analysis of the National Credit Act and the 
extent to which it is able to provide for and maintain a sustainable basis for 
SMME development. It is based upon an examination of the statute itself, the 
Bill that preceded it and the subsequent Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
hearings, as well as interviews with key players in the credit industry.25 While 
it is still very early days given that the Act has only recently been promul-
gated, the article seeks to draw some conclusions regarding the likely impact 
of the NCA on credit provision for unbanked micro and small enterprises. 
Given the fact that the analysis concentrates on the changes as against the 
previous regime, and is not a full-scale economic analysis, the conclusions 
drawn are tentative. 
The starting point for the enquiry is a brief examination of the regulation of 
credit under the Usury Act26 and its exemptions of 1992 and 1999 respectively. 
The next section outlines the moves to reform the credit industry, from the formu-
lation of the National Credit Bill to the Parliamentary Portfolio hearings on the 
Bill. The section thereafter focuses on the main provisions of the National Credit 
Act as well as the key provisions dealing with a special category of credit agree-
ments known as developmental credit agreements. The final section discusses 
the extent to which the Act will promote the provision of credit to MSEs. 
2  THE PRIOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Usury Act, introduced in 1968, prescribed interest rate ceilings for loans. 
The prescribed rates applied to loans irrespective of their purpose and it was 
an offence to charge interest in excess of the stipulated ceiling. The aim of the 
statute was to protect individuals from credit providers that charged exces-
sive rates of interest.27 
The Act, however, had a perverse consequence in that the maximum inter-
est rates it allowed did not off-set the transaction costs of providing smaller 
loans. Large financial institutions therefore had no incentives to serve the 
lower end of the market. Certain lobby groups criticised the Act on this 
ground, arguing that the interest rate limitations were not conducive to the 
provision of loans to emergent small enterprises.28 The Law Review Project29 
 
25 The research upon which this article is based was conducted under the auspices of the Labour 
and Enterprise Policy Research Group at the University of Cape Town as well as for postgraduate 
qualifications. The authors are grateful for the insights and contributions of the following people who 
provided interviews: Mr Stephen Curry, Western Cape Regional Manager of the Umsobomvu Youth 
Fund; Ms Adri Du Toit, Legal Advisor, Casidra (Pty) Ltd; Mr Opar Ledwaba General Operations 
Manager, Free State Development Corporation; Mr Patrick Mabuela, Country Manager, Oikocredit 
Co-operative South Africa; Mr David Mandell, Branch Manager, Eastern Cape Development Corpo-
ration; Mr N Naidoo, Manager, Khethani Business Finance Ltd; Mr Hadle Peterson, Chief Financial 
Officer, Business Finance Agency; Mr George Watson, Managing Director, New Business Finance 
(Pty) Ltd; Mr Mateo Zanetik, Financial Advisor, Small Enterprise Foundation; and Mr Lusizo Zulu, 
Divisions Manager: Finance and Administration in Financial Services, Ithala Development Corpora-
tion. The interviews were conducted telephonically using semi-structured questionnaires between 
August and October 2006.
26 73 of 1968. 
27 Schoombie (fn 20) 755. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The Law Review Project is a NGO that was established to formulate, propose and promote legislative 
change with the aim of promoting economic development.
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submitted proposals to the Minister of Trade to make small loans more viable 
for financial institutions in order to encourage loans for small enterprises.30
As a result of the proposals, in 1992 the Minister granted an exemption to 
the interest limitations set in terms of the Usury Act.31 The exemption applied 
to ‘micro-loans’, defined as loans of less than R6 000 granted for periods 
shorter than 36 months. The aim of the exemption was to allow credit provid-
ers to charge unlimited interest for micro loans so that they would be able 
to recover the full costs of the loan and make a profit, thus making the MSE 
credit market more attractive and ‘spur[ing] growth in lending to micro, small 
and medium enterprises’.32 
The 1992 exemption, however, was not restricted to loans advanced for 
SMME development. Instead, it applied to all loans falling within the pre-
scribed monetary and time limit, irrespective of their purpose. The objective 
to develop SMMEs was therefore conditioned by a broader policy approach 
termed the ‘market development’ approach, that is, that government should 
limit its role to creating the right conditions to allow the market for SMME 
micro-credit to grow rather than intervene more directly by prescribing how 
the market should allocate credit.33
The exemption was problematic for a number of reasons. The choice of the 
R6 000 ceiling was inappropriate because it was well below the minimum 
amount that credit providers could viably lend within the interest rate limita-
tions. In other words, there were good grounds for setting the ceiling much 
higher. The prescribed threshold meant that loans below R6 000 could attract 
unlimited interest irrespective of their purpose, while SMME development 
loans between R6 000 and about R50 00034 were still subject to the Usury 
Act restrictions and therefore unviable for credit providers. Thus, by imposing 
too low a ceiling, the exemption did not apply to the full range of loans that 
SMMEs, and particularly MSEs, required.35 A critical gap in credit provision 
therefore remained.
A second problematic aspect of the exemption was that it did not take 
account of the purpose of the loan: any loan below R6 000 could attract 
the benefit of the exemption, whether or not its purpose was to finance an 
SMME. The exemption therefore failed to provide any incentive to specifi-
cally extend micro loans to SMMEs. This shortcoming created perverse in-
centives for entry into the micro credit industry,36 with commercial lenders 
and furniture retailers soon dominating the market, lending predominantly 
 
 
30 Schoombie (fn 11above) 5.
31 Government Notice No. 3451 of 1992.
32 Schoombie (fn 20 above) 755; Coetzee G K ; Druschel K A; Cook L D; Brislin N W; Meagher J P; 
Roland N W ; Pearson R V ‘The Evolution of the South African microfinance sector from 1992 to 
2004: the Micro Finance Regulatory Council’ (2005) Report prepared for ECI Africa and Iris Centre 
at the University of Maryland p 13.
33 Coetzee et al (fn 34 above) 14.
34 Arguably the minimum that commercial credit providers could profitably lend within the interest rate 
stipulations that existed at that time.
35 Treasury Department ‘SMEs access to finance in South Africa’ www. treasury.gov.za 171.
36 Ibid.
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to salaried workers for consumption purposes.37 These lenders concentrated 
on the borrower’s ability to repay and not on the purpose of the loan.38 As a 
result, the exemption facilitated the growth of a micro credit industry that had 
little interest in developmental finance.39 
A third problem was that the exemption did not impose any checks on the con-
duct of micro lenders. Save for prohibitions on deposit-taking and on investments 
from non-family members, micro lenders were largely left to their own devices.40 
In the absence of regulations, micro lenders exploited desperate and vulnerable 
borrowers and significantly contributed to their over-indebtedness. This situation 
was exacerbated when the state granted lenders access codes to its salary system 
to enable them to deduct instalments directly from civil servants’ salaries.41 Large 
private sector employers soon followed suit.42 These measures reduced the risk 
of lending and lowered collection costs, opening a Pandora’s Box of unsecured 
lending to salaried employees.43 Again, the emphasis was on consumption lend-
ing rather than on lending to advance developmental objectives.
The undesirable situation caused the Minister of Trade and Industry to 
threaten to revoke the 1992 exemption and subsequently to announce his 
intention of raising the exemption ceiling to R50 000. The Minister’s threat 
sparked a five-year debate between stakeholders, with some interest groups 
demanding tighter regulation of the industry to protect vulnerable salaried 
workers and micro lenders arguing for preservation of the status quo.44 The 
controversy ended with the publication of a revised exemption to the Usury 
Act in 1999, which lifted the exemption ceiling on loans to R10 000.45 The 
need to raise the threshold was tempered by a countervailing need to protect 
consumption borrowers from over-exposure to credit, with the result that it re-
mained well below the level that would have significantly impacted on lend-
ing to SMMEs and did not close the gap in credit provision.46 Importantly, the 
rationale behind the new ceiling indicated a shift in the purpose and orienta-
tion of the exemption from development towards consumer protection. 
The 1999 exemption, however, did introduce some positive changes. Impor-
tantly, it provided a regulatory system for the micro credit industry. The ex-
emption from the interest rate limits set in terms of the Usury Act applied only 
if the micro lender complied with the conditions stipulated in the exemption. 
In order to enforce compliance, the exemption designated the Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council (MFRC) as the regulatory body for the industry.47 Lend-
ers providing micro loans had to register with the MFRC and comply with its 
 
37 Meagher and Wilkinson (fn 21 above) 5. 
38 Ibid.
39 Porteous (fn 21 above) 4; Treasury Department (fn 37 above) 171. 
40 Meagher and Wilkinson (fn 21) 5. 
41 Porteous (fn 21 above) 3.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Coetzee et al (fn 34 above) 13; Schoombie (fn 20 above) 756.
45 Meagher and Wilkinson (fn 21 above) 6. 
46 Schoombie (fn 20 above) 756. 
47 The MFRC was a government-funded, non-profit institution established in terms of section 21 of the 
Companies Act. Its mission was to promote the sustainable growth of the micro-credit industry and 
to ensure the protection of consumer rights.
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rules. Its main functions were to investigate compliance with the MFRC Rules 
and the 1999 exemption notice, to investigate and discipline unregistered 
lenders, to publish industry-related information and to initiate research on rel-
evant issues.48 In addition, it had to maintain the National Loans Register, the 
purpose of which was to record all transactions by registered micro lenders.49 
At this stage there was broad consensus that the focus of regulating mi-
cro credit had shifted from SMME promotion to the protection of borrowers 
from lenders’ exploitative practices, such as the over-extension of credit,50 
illegal collection methods and improper inducements.51 In line with this shift 
it is apparent that the MFRC paid little attention to SMME lending. A factor 
that probably played its part in this change of emphasis was government’s 
promotion of wholesale credit provision through the establishment of Khula 
Enterprise Finance Limited. The objective of Khula was to provide wholesale 
credit to retail financial institutions that would lend this on exclusively to 
SMMEs.52 
Commercial banks’ reaction to the two exemptions deserves special atten-
tion. Although initially reluctant to enter the micro loan market, they gradually 
changed their policies and either opened separate micro loan divisions or entered 
partnerships with and acquired stakes in existing commercial micro lenders.53 
Since then the major banks have disbursed loans worth billions of Rand through 
their micro loan divisions or subsidiaries, but the bulk of these loans have been 
advanced to low-income salaried workers for consumption purposes.54 
On a more positive note, a number of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) were established to provide loans to small enterprises after the 
transition to democracy. Many of them served the lower end of the market, 
namely survivalist and micro entrepreneurs. They restricted their focus to 
loans below R10 000 in order to benefit from the exemption and achieve full 
cost recovery, but were critical of the low and restrictive ceiling within which 
48 Ibid.
49 The National Loans Register gave lenders information on existing micro loans and the creditworthi-
ness of potential borrowers. From 1 July 2002 it became compulsory for lenders to submit informa-
tion relating to micro loans to the register and to inquire into a potential borrower’s credit before 
lending: www.mfrc.co.za.
50 In June 2000 the government withdrew payroll deduction facilities for civil servants on unsecured 
loans, which had a serious impact on the micro credit industry: Angela Motsa (fn 6 above) 21. This 
was in response to rising over-indebtedness amongst civil servants, who made up a significant por-
tion of borrowers. In the absence of stable collection alternatives, many lenders were unable to col-
lect arrears and suffered huge losses, and this directly and indirectly caused two of the biggest bank 
collapses (Saambou and Unibank) two years later: Porteous (fn 21 above) 6.
51 Coetzee et al (fn 34 above) 14.
52 Ibid. Wholesale level intervention involves a wholesale or apex financial institution providing 
wholesale credit to retail credit providers who in turn on-lend to borrowers. Khula Enterprise Fi-
nance Limited was established in 1996 in terms of the National Small Enterprise Act. 
53 For a detailed discussion of the banks’ participation in the micro credit industry, see Schoombie (fn 
11 above) 5-9 and Schoombie (fn 20 above) 756-7.
54 Schoombie (fn 11) 8. Standard Bank initiated a micro enterprise pilot project in four black townships 
in 1993. However, it terminated the project in 1996 on the grounds that the R6 000 ceiling was too 
low. It also cited the relatively high wage and security costs and the negative image that would be 
gained from charging full costs and therefore high interest rates. The latter concern was shared by 
most of the other large banks: Schoombie (fn 20 above) 756-7. ABSA’s micro loans division NuBank 
made a commitment of 10% of its loan book to micro enterprises in the initial stages: Schoombie (fn 
11 above) 8.
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they were forced to operate.55 The upper limit on their lending had the result 
that the growth of many of their clients’ enterprises was stunted at the critical 
stage when they were beginning to excel and gain capacity.56 
The general consensus is that the exemptions made micro loans more lu-
crative and increased consumption-oriented micro-lending but did not sig-
nificantly increase access to credit for SMMEs, nor for MSEs in particular.57 
While a number of NGOs entered into the industry to provide micro loans 
to MSEs under the exemptions, they constituted a tiny part of the industry. 
In the period 2004 to 2005 only 4% of the R17 billion worth of micro loans 
disbursed had been used to finance small enterprises.58
3   CHANGING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CREDIT
In 2002 the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) established a Technical 
Committee to review the consumer credit legislation and submit recommen-
dations for a new regulatory framework. Their research and efforts culminated 
in a report submitted to the Minister in October 2003.59 The report identified a 
number of areas for policy and regulatory reform, and after careful considera-
tion the DTI drafted the Consumer Credit Policy Framework.60 This document 
subsequently led to the drafting of the National Credit Bill, which was pub-
lished for public comment in early 2005. 
The National Credit Bill was an attempt to consolidate the different aspects 
of the loan industry covered by the Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act61 
under a single piece of legislation. It therefore aimed to regulate all aspects of 
the credit agreement, defined as a credit facility, a credit transaction, a credit 
guarantee, or any combination of these which were entered into between a 
natural person and a credit provider. In line with this aim the Bill sought to: 
• improve transparency; 
• prohibit unfair contractual terms and practices; 
• prohibit anti-competitive practices; 
• curb reckless credit extension; 
• provide measures to assist over-indebted consumers; 
• regulate information acquired, held and reported by credit bureaux; 
• create a central register of debt obligations; and 
• establish a Credit Regulator and Credit Tribunal for effective enforcement. 
The Bill also created two special categories of credit agreements, namely de-
velopmental credit agreements and public interest credit agreements. The 
former focused on, amongst other things, the SMME sector. 
55 Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation (fn16 above).
56 Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation (fn 16 above).
57 Schoombie (fn 20 above) 755, Coetzee et al (fn 34 above) 14.
58 MFRC Fact Sheet accessed at www.mfrc.co.za.
59 The result was the Credit Law Review (2003) published by the DTI.
60 Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy framework for Consumer Credit (2004), published by the DTI. 
61 75 of 1980.
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On 5 August 2005 the Department of Trade and Industry’s Portfolio Com-
mittee began public hearings on the National Credit Bill. Because of its wide 
scope and potentially far-reaching consequences, the Bill received a lot of 
publicity and was hotly debated. Submissions were made by a large number 
of bodies and individuals, including public interest groups, academics, po-
litical parties, legal practitioners, banks, credit providers, retail outlets, tel-
ecommunications companies and the infamous credit bureaux. The public 
hearings stretched over two weeks to accommodate the large volume of sub-
missions. 
Many credit providers such as banks and retailers objected to a number 
of the provisions on the grounds that they imposed costly and burdensome 
obligations on them. These included the duties to conduct investigations to 
prevent reckless lending and to send monthly statements to borrowers. Re-
tailers also complained that the five-day cooling off period afforded to those 
who bought goods on credit was prejudicial to them. The most emotive topic, 
however, related to the role of credit bureaux in providing information to 
credit providers and the (sometimes unwarranted) blacklisting of borrowers. 
The respective roles of and interaction between the National Credit Regula-
tor and the National Credit Tribunal were also scrutinised. In addition, some 
stakeholders were concerned about the cost of and exercise of choice in ob-
taining credit insurance.
As noted above, the Bill made reference to a special category of credit agree-
ments termed developmental credit agreements. These were defined as credit 
agreements entered into for the purpose of small business development, edu-
cation and low-income housing. Remarkably, the provisions relating to de-
velopment credit agreements received almost no attention during the course 
of the public hearings, with only one submission being made in relation to 
them. 62 The latter submission raised concerns about the proposed interest 
rate limits that would apply to developmental credit and appealed for special 
consideration to be given to the high cost of credit associated with lending 
small amounts to low income groups. In addition, the submission argued that 
developmental credit providers should be exempted from the requirement to 
register their credit agreements on the proposed National Credit Register, or 
alternatively, they should be exempted from having to provide the addresses 
of their clients where this information was not available. 
62 The submission was made by credit providers that were providing micro loans for small business 
development and low-income housing in terms of the 1999 exemption. The group was represented by 
the Small Enterprise Foundation, one of the leading micro enterprise credit providers in South Africa.
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A number of amendments were made to the Bill after the public hearings 
and it was finally gazetted as law in March 2006, although its commencement 
will take place in stages. 63  
4  THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT
4.1  General Provisions
The National Credit Act aims ‘to promote and advance the social and eco-
nomic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, 
sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry’.64 The Act emphasises the needs of South Africans who have histori-
cally been unable to access credit under sustainable conditions.65 It also aims 
to promote a responsible credit market and balance the countervailing rights 
of consumers and credit providers.66 It further regulates consumer credit in-
formation and reporting; over-indebtedness and reckless lending; debt en-
forcement and dispute resolution.67
The Act applies only to ‘credit agreements between parties dealing at arm’s 
length’68 and excludes certain transactions from its ambit.69 Section 8 defines 
credit agreements as credit facilities, credit transactions and credit guaran-
tees. Loans for money will fall under the scope of credit transactions or credit 
facilities and are therefore subject to the Act. 
The Act establishes the National Credit Regulator (NCR) to regulate the 
credit industry and realise its objectives. In terms of the Act, the NCR as-
sumed the assets and liabilities of the MFRC and also took over its employ-
ees, including the CEO (who was extensively involved in the drafting of the 
Act).70
63 In terms of Government Gazette 28824 of 11 May 2006:
	 •	 	Sections 1-11 (definitions, interpretation, application and purpose), 12-25 (establishment of the 
NCR and its functions), 35-38 (administration matters), 39-59 (consumer credit industry regula-
tion), 69 (National Credit Registry), 73 (verification, review and removal of consumer credit in-
formation), 134-152 (dispute settlement other than debt enforcement), 153-162 (enforcement of 
the Act), 164-170 (miscellaneous matters), 171-173 (Ministerial regulations, conflicts with other 
legislation, repeal and short title and commencement), Schedule 1-3 (rules concerning conflicting 
legislation, amendment of laws and transitional provisions): came into operation on 1 June 2006; 
	 •	 	Sections 26-34 (National Consumer Tribunal), 67 (conflicting legislation), 68 (right to confidential 
treatment), 70 (credit bureaux information) and 72 (right to access and challenge credit records 
and information) came into operation on 1 September 2006; and 
	 •	 	Sections 60-66 (consumer credit policy), 71 (removal of judgments), 74-88 (credit marketing 
practices, recklessness and over-indebtedness), 89-123 (unlawful credit agreements; disclosure; 
consumer liability for interest, charges and fees; statements of account; alteration of credit agree-
ments; rescission and termination of credit agreements), 124-133 (collection, repayment, surren-
der and debt enforcement) and 163 (agents): came into operation on 1 June 2007.





69 Section 8(2) of the Act excludes the following transactions from the definition: insurance policies 
extended solely to maintain the payment of premiums on an insurance policy; leases of immovable 
property, and transactions between stokvels and their members. Section 4 of the Act excludes the 
application of the Act to certain credit agreements. 
70 Item 8 of Schedule 3 to the Act. 
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One important function of the NCR is the registration and regulation of role 
players in the credit industry.71 A person (natural or juristic) who is a credit pro-
vider in terms of at least 100 credit agreements or who is owed a total principal 
debt exceeding a minimum prescribed amount, is obliged to register with the 
NCR.72 Registered credit providers must comply with the conditions of registra-
tion and the provisions of the Act. Sections 15 and 55 provide the NCR with 
wide-ranging powers to ensure compliance.73 The NCR must monitor and in-
vestigate the conduct of credit providers and must also establish mechanisms 
to enable the public to make complaints and must conduct informal dispute 
resolution. The NCR may issue compliance notices against non-compliant 
credit providers and may refer contraventions of the Act for prosecution. 
In addition, section 69 of the Act requires the NCR to establish and main-
tain a national register of outstanding credit agreements. A registered credit 
provider will be obliged to record every credit agreement it enters into on the 
National Credit Register.74 It will also have to record details of each transac-
tion, the details of the consumer involved and particulars relating to the ter-
mination or satisfaction of the credit agreement.75 Previously, credit providers 
only had to comply with similar registration requirements in respect of micro 
loans granted in terms of the 1999 Exemption; no register was kept for other 
credit agreements. In the absence of unfavourable information listed with 
the credit bureaux or full disclosure by a potential borrower, credit providers 
were unable to establish the full debt exposure of potential borrowers before 
advancing them credit.
In the long-term the registration requirement will probably have some im-
pact on lending to unbanked MSEs. One objection by large banks and com-
mercial credit providers to lending to (particularly emergent) entrepreneurs 
has been that they do not have a credit history as information relating to 
their debt exposure and repayment profiles is not readily available.76 They 
also claim that it is more expensive to perform a credit assessment of such 
an enterprise or entrepreneur.77 The new Act should overcome these barriers 
by ensuring that a small enterprise’s (or entrepreneur’s) credit history will be 
available to a potential credit provider. As all registered credit providers will 
be required to record their agreements and will have access to the informa-
tion on the Register, they will share the costs and benefits of using the Regis-
ter. However, this information will only be generated where micro and small 
entrepreneurs obtain credit from formal, registered credit providers. 
Another section of the Act could have ramifications for SMME credit. In 
the event that a potential borrower, in this context an entrepreneur, lacks a 
credit history or is blacklisted, and lacks sufficient security for a loan, a credit 
provider may have recourse to section 106 of the Act. This section states that 
 
71 Section 14 of the Act.
72 Section 41(1) of the Act.
73 Section 15 read with section 55 of the Act. 
74 Section 69(2) of the Act.
75 Section 69(2) read with section 69(3) of the Act.
76 Treasury Department (note 37) p 174.
77 Ibid.
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a credit provider is entitled to require a borrower to take out a credit life insur-
ance policy for the duration of a credit agreement. This will enable a credit 
provider to be compensated for the outstanding amount in the event that the 
borrower defaults. The borrower will have a choice as to whether to take out 
a policy provided by the credit provider or by any other insurer. While it is 
impossible to speculate about the extent to which SMME credit providers will 
make use of this provision, it would certainly provide greater security with 
certain clients. However, the high risk involved will increase the insurance 
premiums and consequently the cost of credit for entrepreneurs required to 
take out credit insurance. 
4.2  Developmental Credit Agreements
Besides the above more general provisions that will have an impact on SMME 
credit, and MSE loans in particular, the Act retains the special category of 
credit agreements – known as developmental credit agreements – introduced 
in the Bill.78 An agreement, irrespective of its form, type or category is a de-
velopment agreement if it is in respect of education, low income housing 
or the development of a small business as defined in the National Small 
Enterprise Act.79 Loans to SMMEs therefore qualify as developmental credit 
agreements.
Developmental credit agreements are accorded special treatment in three 
ways. First, the Act imposes a duty on the National Credit Regulator to take 
measures to increase the provision of developmental credit for entrepre-
neurs. Second, developmental credit providers may be entitled to statutory 
exceptions from the Act, provided they undergo supplementary registration.80 
Third, the Regulations in terms of the Act make special provision for interest 
rates that may be charged in respect of SMME loans. Each instance of special 
treatment is discussed in more detail below.
Section 13 of the Act provides that an accessible credit market must cater 
for inter alia the needs of historically disadvantaged and low income persons 
and communities. The section also requires the NCR to monitor and report 
to the Minister on access to credit by SMMEs. This shows that they are a 
group requiring special attention as far as access to credit is concerned. Thus, 
section 13 requires the NCR to take measures to encourage the provision of 
SMME credit agreements.
78 S 10(1) of the Act. 
79 The Minister may prescribe any other purposes for these agreements. A non-profit credit agreement 
between a credit co-operative and its member qualifies as a development agreement if the principal 
amount is less than R15 000.
80 In terms of section 41 the requirements for supplementary registration are:
	 •	 	the credit provider must be a close corporation, credit co-operative, trust, statutory entity, mutual 
bank or bank;
	 •	 the credit provider must be registered with the South African Revenue Service;
	 •	 the credit provider is not managed or controlled by a disqualified person;
	 •	 	the credit provider has sufficient resources or the capacity to acquire the necessary resources to 
effectively perform its functions;
 •  the credit provider has an adequate administrative system or a plan to develop such a system to 
justify exemption from certain provisions of the Act.
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The NCR may use a number of its general powers to fulfil its responsibility to 
increase SMME access to credit. It may conduct research, audits and investiga-
tions to establish and investigate demographic patterns, socio-economic trends, 
the promotion of black economic empowerment, and the needs of previously 
disadvantaged, low income communities in the credit market.81 It must also es-
tablish and maintain relations with other regulatory authorities.82 In discharging 
this responsibility it may initiate dialogue and liaise with any regulatory authority 
that may have an interest in or a role to play with regard to SMME credit. 
Because the NCR has only recently been established, its role in encourag-
ing greater SMME credit provision and the measures that it will take are yet to 
be seen. However, there is a question mark over its functioning in this regard. 
The public hearings indicate that developmental credit agreements were not 
a matter of urgency or even priority; technical commercial provisions and 
consumer protection attracted most of the attention. In addition, the National 
Credit Regulator took over its core staff and functions from the MFRC, which 
paid very little attention to SMME credit during its existence. It is therefore 
unlikely that the NCR will (particularly during the initial stages) commit sig-
nificant resources towards efforts to increase SMME access to finance. 
The second instance of special treatment is that section 41 requires credit 
providers wishing to extend developmental credit to undertake supplemen-
tary registration in order to qualify for ‘statutory exceptions from this Act’. Ap-
plicants for supplementary registration must show that they have ‘adequate’ 
administrative procedures to justify the application of the statutory excep-
tions. The only reference to a possible ‘statutory exception’ for developmen-
tal credit providers in the Act itself is 69(6), which provides that the Minister 
may provide ‘alternative requirements’ with respect to the registration of de-
tails of developmental credit agreements on the National Credit Register.83 
The Bill that was debated in Parliament in August 2005 did not contain this 
provision. It was arguably added as a concession to the demands of develop-
mental credit providers during the course of the public hearings.84 
Developmental credit providers raised concerns that compliance with the 
requirement to record credit agreements on the National Credit Register 
might be too costly and would adversely affect their sustainability.85 They 
also proposed that in recognition of their methodologies86 and their empow-
erment agenda, the Act should exempt the non-collateralised loans from the 
reporting requirements.87 They argued that at the very least they should be 
exempted from providing the addresses of their clients, as many of their cli-
ents living in townships cannot furnish proof of their addresses.88 
81 S 16 of the Act. 
82 S 17 of the Act.
83 S 69(6) of the Act.
84 These were developmental credit providers providing loans for less than R10 000 for micro enter-
prise and housing at the lowest end of the market. 
85 Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation (fn16 above).
86 They normally do not require collateral and do repossess clients’ assets if they are unable to repay a 
loan.
87 Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation (fn 16 above).
88 Ibid.
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It is unclear what is envisaged by the phrase ‘alternative requirements’, 
and thus far no regulations have been made in this regard. However, it is an 
issue that needs to be approached cautiously. While acknowledging the po-
tential harm of burdensome reporting requirements, the wholesale exclusion 
of developmental credit providers from the requirements could be counter-
productive. For example, excluding reporting in respect of non-collateralised 
loans could lead to an inaccurate calculation of an enterprise’s or an entre-
preneur’s credit exposure, thereby prejudicing other potential credit provid-
ers. This would perpetuate the absence of credit information regarding micro 
and small entrepreneurs and raise the risk of lending to SMMEs, with the 
result that they will continue to be marginalised from the mainstream credit 
industry. The availability of information relating to all borrowers is therefore 
critical for ensuring that credit providers are not discouraged from lending to 
certain categories of borrowers on the basis of insufficient information. 
Another possible exception (although not specifically mentioned in the Act 
or the Regulations) for developmental credit providers relates to credit pro-
viders’ marketing practices. The Act prohibits all credit providers from us-
ing certain marketing practices which may prejudice borrowers and potential 
borrowers, for instance, visiting borrowers and potential borrowers in their 
homes. Developmental credit providers – particularly those serving rural cli-
ents – lobbied for an exemption from this particular prohibition as many visit 
rural clients that cannot afford to travel to the credit providers’ offices in order 
to make their products accessible. Such visits also enable the development 
credit providers to assess the home-based businesses. The exemption was 
expected at the end of 2006 but to date has not been granted. Given the so-
cially desirable purpose of developmental credit agreements and the low risk 
of the abuse in this context, there is no reason why the exemption should not 
be granted by the Minister. 
The third way in which the Act affords SMMEs special treatment is through 
interest rate ceilings. The approach adopted in the Act departs from the 
previous regime in that interest rate ceilings are determined on the basis of 
the types of credit agreements and not the size of the loan. The Regulations 
provide that loans made for inter alia SMME development shall attract the 
highest interest that may be charged in terms of the Act, irrespective of the 
loan size.89 Based on the current repurchase rate, the actual rate at which 
developmental credit providers will be allowed to charge is 36% per annum. 
The primary reason for allowing developmental credit providers to recover 
the maximum possible interest is to facilitate full cost recovery in light of the 
higher risks involved and the unconventional methodologies that they may 
use, for instance not requiring collateral. A related reason is to encourage 
developmental credit lending.
89 Regulations in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 Government Gazette 28864 of 2006, Item 
42(1): maximum interest for SMME development, low income housing and unsecured credit agree-
ments shall be [(Repurchase Rate x 2.2) + 20%] per year; for mortgages [(Repurchase Rate x 2.2) + 
5%]  for credit facilities and for credit facilities and all other credit agreements [(Repurchase Rate x 
2.2) + 10%]. 
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It is difficult to predict with any certainty the effect that the interest rate 
ceiling will have on SMME lending. Furthermore, given that the industry is 
undergoing a transition from one regulatory regime to another, it is prob-
able that there will be different impacts according to whether SMME credit 
providers are exclusively lending amounts below R10 000 (and who pre-
viously fell under the 1999 Exemption), or are providing loans below and 
above R10 000. It is also probable that the ceiling will impact differently on 
credit providers that have not previously provided credit to SMMEs. 
One would assume that MSE credit providers that exclusively provided 
loans below R10 000 and charged interest in the region of, for example, 80% 
per annum under the 1999 exemption will be adversely affected by the new 
interest rate limitation. However, the representative of one such developmen-
tal credit provider argued that the ceiling of 36% will not impact on these 
institutions because the Act introduces initiation fees and monthly admin-
istration fees that will enable these institutions to recover the costs of credit 
provision.90 In other words, the latter fees will off-set the reduction in the 
interest they are able to charge. The downside is that while these fees in con-
junction with interest will encourage full cost recovery for smaller loans, they 
are less transparent and make it difficult for the borrower to determine the 
true cost of the loan. They may therefore be used by ‘less scrupulous credit 
providers to try to hide the true cost of credit’,91 thereby directly contradicting 
one of the objectives of the Act.92 This is why developmental credit providers 
advancing loans below R10 000 proposed that the Minister should rather set 
realistic interest rate ceilings and exclude such fees for developmental credit 
agreements.93
On the other hand, the combination of interest and fees may have a posi-
tive impact on developmental credit providers that restricted themselves to 
loans of less than R10 000. The new dispensation attempts to enable de-
velopmental credit providers to recover their full costs for loans to SMMEs 
below and above R10 000. This will remove the need to restrict themselves 
to loans below R10 000 and should enable these developmental credit pro-
viders to offer a wider range of loan sizes to meet their clients’ needs.94 So, 
they should be able to ‘scale up’ their loan products, which will go some way 
towards filling the gap in the provision of credit to unbanked MSEs. 
Some SMME credit providers did not restrict their loan sizes to R10 000, 
providing loans below and above this amount. Furthermore, these credit pro-
viders did not make use of the 1999 exemption and charged interest below 
the Usury Act ceiling of 20% in respect of all their credit agreements. They 
will therefore be able to charge more interest under the new Regulations. 
However, interviews with a range of these credit providers indicate that they 
will not increase the interest they charge because they can operate satisfac-
torily at the existing rate. The market would also exert downward pressure on 
 
90 These charges are applicable to all credit agreements.
91 Although the NCA requires that the full cost of the credit is disclosed to the borrower.
92 Submission by Small Enterprise Foundation (fn 16 above).
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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rates: the director of a commercial MSE credit provider stated that any insti-
tution that charged interest in the region of 30% would be ‘pricing itself out 
of the market’. It is therefore unlikely that the changes in the interest regime 
will have any impact on the product range, choice of clients, or level of MSE 
lending of such credit providers. 
The higher rate of interest attached to developmental credit agreements, 
however, will be unlikely to attract commercial (i.e. non-developmental) fi-
nancial institutions into this market. The rate of interest charged is only one 
factor when considering whether to provide credit to SMMEs. The availability 
of collateral or other security, the viability of the enterprise, and the manage-
ment capabilities of the entrepreneur are also important factors; all of which 
will be seen as barriers by commercial lenders. Furthermore, SMME credit 
providers indicate that their work is not just a money-making enterprise, but 
requires sound knowledge of the nature of SMMEs and commitment to pro-
viding the necessary advice and support to ensure their success. Commercial 
lenders that do not have experience of working with SMMEs or share such 
a commitment will not be attracted to the SMME market. Where there are 
new entrants it is likely that they will focus on lending to medium-sized en-
terprises rather than to ‘more risky’ MSEs. 
5   THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW ACT FOR UNBANKED 
MSEs
This article has outlined the shortcomings of the previous regime, particularly 
with regard to lending to SMMEs: the limitations in respect of the ceilings on 
loans; the unintended consequence of creating a predominantly consump-
tion-driven micro credit industry; and the emergence of numerous undesira-
ble practices such as reckless lending and over-indebtedness. The question is 
whether the National Credit Act addresses these problems and will facilitate 
a significant expansion in lending to unbanked MSEs? And a bigger question 
is whether the Act will, in this regard, have an impact on poverty, unemploy-
ment and income inequality? In this section we make some tentative points 
regarding the Act’s likely impact on unbanked MSEs. 
The National Credit Act clearly attempts to chart a new direction for the 
regulation of SMME credit provision. The recognition of developmental 
agreements as a particular category of credit agreements that receive special 
treatment is a commendable step. The Act, furthermore, identifies SMMEs 
as a group requiring the NCR’s special attention when carrying out its duty 
to create an accessible credit market. Special treatment and concessions for 
developmental credit agreements will only be granted to credit providers who 
demonstrate their commitment to economic development and who are regis-
tered as developmental credit providers. This will prevent abuse of these ben-
efits and advantages by credit providers that are not development-oriented, 
as was the case under the Usury Act Exemptions. 
However, the effect of the new interest regulations on the SMME credit 
market is yet to be seen. As noted above, higher interest rates alone are un-
likely to entice existing commercial credit providers to enter the SMME mar-
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ket, let alone to lend to MSEs. The new interest rates are also unlikely to 
have much effect on SMME credit providers who provided loans above   R10 
000 as they are currently operating optimally at rates below the new maxi-
mum rate. Where there is likely to be an impact is on credit providers that 
provided loans below R10 000 to MSEs in terms of the 1999 Exemption. 
The new dispensation will free these credit providers from the R10 000 limit 
and enable them to expand their product range and increase their financial 
support to MSE clients. This will increase the availability of loans and con-
tribute towards closing the current gap in credit provision to MSEs. But it is 
arguable that this will not be enough to entirely fill the gap in credit provision 
to MSEs. The Act should have provided more incentives for the commercial 
credit providers to lower the limit at which they lend to SMMEs, thereby nar-
rowing the gap. 
The Act attempts to address problems with risk assessment by requiring all 
registered credit providers to share information relating to their clients and 
credit agreements on the National Credit Register. The developmental credit 
providers asked to be exempted from entering information on the register, 
and there is provision for ‘alternative arrangements’ for them in the Act. It is 
not known at this point what these arrangements will be but the wholesale 
exemption of developmental credit providers runs the risk of being counter-
productive. The use of the Register by all credit providers will increase the 
availability of information and enable them to assess the creditworthiness 
of entrepreneurs. Placing developmental credit providers outside this system 
will merely entrench their marginalisation. While the ability of credit provid-
ers to resort to credit insurance in terms of the new Act could temper the 
adverse consequences of the above, this will increase the cost of credit to the 
entrepreneur. Again, it does not appear that these provisions will encourage 
non-SMME credit providers to enter the MSE market in significant numbers. 
In theory, the NCR’s functions and powers in terms of the Act place it in a 
position to play an important role in the facilitation of access to SMME credit. 
The measures taken and their success will largely depend on the commitment 
of and priorities set by the NCR. However, from the commercial and consum-
er-protection orientation of the Act, the tone of the public hearings on the Bill 
and the MFRC’s track record on SMME promotion, it is unlikely that the NCR 
will give developmental credit agreements the attention that they deserve. 
As noted above, the analysis presented is limited by the relative ‘newness’ 
of the Act. In addition, it does not give a full analysis of the economics of the 
SMME credit market. Future research will be required to assess the impact of 
the Act on the unbanked MSE credit market as the Act begins to modify com-
mercial practice. This research should adopt a cross-disciplinary approach 
involving researchers with a sound understanding of the economics of the 
SMME credit market, and should incorporate empirical research drawing on 
the views of credit providers, micro and small entrepreneurs, policy makers 
and NCA officials.
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6  CONCLUSION 
The National Credit Act cannot alone solve the problem of MSE access to 
credit and it certainly cannot provide the panacea for bridging the divide 
between the first and second economies. The barriers to lending to unbanked 
MSEs are symptomatic of deficiencies in the socio-economic environment 
that cannot be fully addressed by credit policy and legal interventions alone. 
Increasing MSEs’ access to credit will require a holistic approach that must 
involve the participation of a number of role players. These include the full 
range of wholesale and retail credit providers: government institutions, com-
mercial firms, non-governmental organisations and community-based organ-
isations. Broader social and economic reforms are also necessary to over-
come these barriers, including improving the quality of the education system; 
improving MSEs’ access to markets, which are the lifeblood of the success of 
any enterprise; and alleviating poverty in general. 
While acknowledging the limitations of legal interventions, it is clear that 
the National Credit Act has an important role to play. Whether it will play its 
part optimally is difficult to say at this point: it is still too early to tell what 
its impact will be on unbanked MSEs. However, while the Act recognises the 
plight of those who previously did not have access to credit and gives special 
attention to SMME credit provision, our view is that the Act is unlikely to dra-
matically increase the availability of credit to micro and small entrepreneurs 
currently unable to obtain credit from formal institutions. The orientation 
of the Act remains the commercial end of the market and consumer protec-
tion rather than developmental credit. It therefore to a large extent continues 
within the ‘market development’ approach that informed the design of the 
1992 and 1999 Exemptions. 
The problem of access to credit for MSEs requires a bolder approach on the 
part of government. This is not to say that it should advocate a policy that 
encourages the indiscriminate provision of credit to MSEs. What is required, 
rather, is a more interventionist approach in order to ensure that develop-
mental credit gets the attention that it needs. Such an approach would need 
more directed legislative mechanisms but would also include programmes to 
expand and support the institutional framework for micro credit. Interest rate 
ceilings and exemptions from administrative requirements are unlikely to be 
enough to steer much more than the existing tiny proportion of the multi-bil-
lion Rand credit industry to MSEs.
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